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This paper analyzes the relationship between the number 
of documents required to export and import and the 
time it takes to complete all procedures to trade. It shows 
that an increase in the number of documents required 
for export and import tends to increase the time cost 
of shipments. However, this relationship is far from 
simplistic, varying sharply in magnitude across rich 
versus poor countries and small versus large countries. 
Specifically, the increase in the time cost of increased 
documentation is much larger for relatively poor and 
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contacted at mamin@worldbank.org.  
larger countries. One interpretation of this finding 
is that richer countries that have more resources and 
smaller countries that rely more on trade invest more in 
building efficient documentation systems. Hence, in such 
countries relative to others, increased documentation 
adds less to the time cost at the margin. At a broader 
level, the findings suggest caution in interpreting how 
input-based measures such as the number of required 
documents to trade affect the quality of the business 
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1. Introduction 
With the decline in tariff and non-tariff barriers to international trade, trade facilitation measures 
are increasingly becoming the focus of policy makers for the continued growth of trade (see for 
example, Wilson et al. 2003). In a narrow sense, trade facilitation measures simply address the 
logistics of moving goods through ports and the documentation associated with cross-border 
trade. The present paper focuses on the number of documents required to export and import. 
However, instead of taking the number of required documents as a measure of trade facilitation 
itself, we focus on the associated time cost. Specifically, we analyze the relationship between the 
number  of  documents  required  to  export  and  import  and  the  time  it  takes  to  complete  all 
procedures to trade. What is the nature of this relationship? 
  In answering this question, we follow a novel approach in suggesting that the impact of 
increased documentation on the time cost (of exporting and importing) may not be a simple 
positive one; that is, it is likely to depend on how efficient the underlying system is in supplying 
the required documents. To this end, we make two plausible hypotheses. First, richer countries 
are likely to invest more in the underlying system of documentation and hence the increase in 
time cost associated with a unit increase in the number of required documents is likely to be 
smaller than that for the poorer countries.  
Second, a number of studies have shown that small countries trade more as a proportion 
of their GDP than the large countries. In fact, trade openness is one of the few cases where 
country size seems to matter for economic or even social variables.
1 One argument here is that 
smallness of markets limits the exploitation of economies of scale, forcing the smaller countries 
more than the larger countries to expand market size through international trade beyond their 
                                                           
1 For example, Rose (2006) shows that small countries are more open to trade than large countries, but country 
size does not matter for a number of other economic and social phenomena including inflation, health, quality of 
institutions and income levels.  3 
 
political borders (Alesina 2002, Alesina and Wacziarg 1998). If trade is more important to small 
compared with large countries, we might suspect that the relatively smaller countries are more 
likely  to  invest  in  more  efficient  documentation  system.  Hence,  we  hypothesize  that  a  unit 
increase in the number of required documents leads to a smaller increase in the time cost in the 
small compared with large countries.  
We test the two hypotheses mentioned above using panel data on 125 countries for which 
data are available on our main variables. The regression results strongly confirm both the stated 
hypotheses. 
  The present paper is restricted to a regulatory aspect of trade facilitation; that is, the 
number of documents required to trade and the associated time cost. The importance of such 
regulatory measures for trade cannot be denied, although formal empirical work on this issue is 
still in its infancy. For example, a recent study by Djankov et al. (2010) uses the same time cost 
measure as we do in the present paper and finds it has significant effects on the volume of trade. 
The study estimates that for each additional day that a product is delayed prior to being shipped 
reduces the volume of trade by more than 1 percent. Alternatively, each day is equivalent to a 
country distancing itself from its trade partners by about 70 kilometers on average. The present 
paper complements such studies in highlighting an important determinant of the time cost of 
clearing all the required procedures for shipment.  
  Notwithstanding the importance of time costs of shipments and the number of required 
documents, trade facilitation extends to a number of other dimensions that we do not include in 
the  present  study.  Examples  include  internet  availability  (Freund  and  Weinhold,  2000)  and 
standards harmonization and automating customs procedures (Herter et al. 2001). Hence, we 
caution that our results discussed below should be treated with due caution and not generalized 4 
 
to  other  aspects  of  trade  facilitation  without  further  analysis.  For  example,  standards 
harmonization could reduce time cost of shipment clearance, but this effect could vary depending 
on the overall efficiency of the customs procedures. Much like as in our case, the relationship 
between standards harmonization and the time cost of shipment clearance could vary between 
rich and poor countries and between small and large countries. However, this is an empirical 
issue that requires validation or rejection. 
  The plan of the remaining sections is as follows. In section 2 we describe the data and the 
empirical  methodology.  Regression  results  for  our  main  specification  along  with  robustness 
checks are provided in section 3. The concluding section summarizes the main findings of the 
paper and suggests scope for future work. 
 
2. Data description and methodology 
Our sample consists of a panel of 125 countries for which data are available for all our main 
variables. The data span six years from 2005 to 2010. To avoid the simultaneity problem, we use 
lagged values of the various explanatory variables including the number of documents required 
to trade (discussed in detail below). The panel nature of the data allows us to control for all 
unobserved and time invariant country specific factors through country fixed effects. Similarly, 
we are able to control for all time or year specific factors common to all countries through time 
fixed effects.  That  is,  the regression results  discussed below are obtained from  fixed-effects 
panel data estimation method.
2 However, given the short span of the panel data, there is not 
enough variation over time in either the income level or country size measured by population . 
Hence, the variation in the effects of the number of required documents to trade on the time cost 
                                                           
2 That is, we use the Ordinary Least Squares estimation method with country and year fixed effects included in the 
specification. 5 
 
across rich vs. poor countries and across small vs. large countries is estimated with income and 
country  size  assumed  to  be  constant  over  time;  only  the  number  of  required  documents  is 
allowed to vary temporally. This is discussed in more detail below. 
All standard errors used for computing the significance levels of the estimated coefficient 
values are Huber-White robust. Throughout the paper, significance level is denoted by 
*** (1 
percent or less), 
** (5 percent or less) and 
* (10 percent or less). 
  A formal definition of all the variables used in the paper is provided in Table 1. Summary 
statistics of the main variables and the correlation between the main explanatory variables are 
provided in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. 
 
2.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable equals the log of the time (recorded in calendar days) it takes to clear all 
procedures  to  export  and  import  (Timeit).  The  subscripts  i,t  denote  the  country  and  year, 
respectively. As mentioned above, the time span for the variable is 2005 to 2010. However, since 
we use lagged values of the explanatory variable, number of required documents, we lose the 
first  year  (2005)  values  of  Time.  The  data  source  for  the  variable  is  World  Bank’s  Doing 
Business project. We note that Time includes the time cost of all procedures as well as the 
waiting time between procedures (for example, during unloading of the cargo). Hence, only part 
of the variation in the time cost of shipments across countries and time can be explained by the 
variation in the number of required documents. 
  In the full sample, the mean value of Time equals 3.98 and the standard deviation is .51. 
Averaging over time, the value of Time is highest for Iraq (5.27) and lowest for Panama (2.89). 
Computing the annual change in the value of  Time, the change averages -.047 or about 1.2 6 
 
percent of the mean value of Time. In terms of the frequency, about 36 percent of the countries 
witnessed a change in the value of Time in any two consecutive years on average. Further, over 
the entire time span of 2006-2010, every country in the sample experienced a change at least 
once in the value of Time. 
 
2.2 Main explanatory variables 
Our first explanatory variable is the (log of) number of documents required to export and import 
as measured by the World Bank’s Doing Business project (Documents). As mentioned above, to 
avoid simultaneity problem, we use one year lagged values of the variable. Hence, the regression 
results discussed below cover the period 2006 to 2010. The mean value of Documents equals 
2.73 and the standard deviation is .27. Averaging over time for each country, the highest value of 
Documents  is  observed  in  Central  African  Republic  (3.23)  and  lowest  in  Panama  (1.96). 
Computing annual changes in the value of Documents, the mean value of the change equals -.024 
or  .89  percent  of  the  mean  value  of  Documents  and  the  standard  deviation  equals  .12.  On 
average, in any two consecutive years, over 13 percent of the countries in the sample witnessed a 
change in the value of Documents. Further, every country in our sample witnessed a change in 
the value of Documents at least once over the time period under study. 
  To see how the correlation between Time and Documents varies by income and country 
size, we interact Documents with a measure of per capita income level and country size. For 
income level, we use log of GDP per capita, PPP adjusted and at constant 2005 international 
dollars. Values of GDP per capita used in the paper are average values taken over 2001-2005 
(Income). The data source for the variable is World Development Indicators, World Bank. We 
note that lagged values of GDP per capita are used in order to avoid the potential simultaneity 7 
 
problem with our estimation results. Also, due to the short span of the data, we do not exploit 
variations over time in the level of income. Hence, what our results seek to establish is the 
differential effect of the number of required documents on the time cost across countries that are 
at different levels of income to begin with. The same holds for our measure of country size 
which equals the log of the average level of total population of a country where the average is 
taken  over  2001-2005  (Population).  The  data  source  for  Population  is  World  Development 
Indicators, World Bank. 
  Briefly, the mean value of Income equals 8.0 and the standard deviation equals .94. For 
Population, the corresponding figures equal 15.6 and 2.03, respectively. We check all our results 
for potential outliers, especially with respect to countries that are very small (island countries) 
and the very large countries.
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  Our estimation equation takes the following form 
 
                                                                                  
                                                              
 
2.3 Other explanatory variables 
The remaining explanatory variables in the regression results discussed below are motivated to 
guard against the potential omitted variable bias or spurious correlation problem. We would like 
to mention here that our main focus is on the interaction terms in the equation above. That is, 
how the relationship between the number of required documents and the time cost varies across 
                                                           
3 We do find that Afghanistan, China and Tanzania have unduly large effects on our results. Including China in the 
sample  makes  our  results  weaker  while  the  opposite  holds  for  Afghanistan.  For  Tanzania,  the  results  vary 
depending on the specification. To ensure that our results are not unduly affected by individual countries, we 
exclude Afghanistan, China and Tanzania from our sample. 8 
 
countries at different levels of income and population. The chances of spurious correlation for 
our  interaction  terms  are  less  severe  than  it  is  otherwise  the  case  with  level  variables.  For 
example,  it  is  entirely  plausible  to  suggest  that  the  relatively  richer  countries  have  less 
corruption. So, our income variable could easily pick up the effect of corruption, if any, on the 
dependent  variable.  However,  there  is  little  theoretical  or  empirical  reason  to  believe  that 
corruption  should  affect  the  strength  of  the  relationship  between  the  number  of  required 
documents and the dependent variable. In short, while income may spuriously pick up the effect 
of corruption on the dependent variable, there is no reason to suggest that this holds for the 
interaction term also (Documents*Income picking up the effect of Documents* Corruption level). 
Nevertheless, we show that our results survive a number of controls such as for corruption, etc. 
  Our first set of controls includes the country and year fixed effects. As discussed above, 
these controls ensure that our main results are robust to all time invariant country specific factors 
(country fixed effects) as well as world-wide shocks to the dependent variable in a given year 
(time fixed effects). In short, what these controls imply is regressing changes in the explanatory 
variables on changes in the dependent variable. Such first-differenced regressions tend to suffer 
less from the omitted variable bias problem than regressions based on the actual levels of the 
variables (cross-section data). 
  One could still argue that the differential effect of the required documents on the time 
cost across income and population levels could be spuriously driven by a non-linearity in the 
documents-time cost relationship. That is, the reason why the effect of documents on the time 
cost varies with the income (or population) level is that income simply picks up higher or lower 
values of Documents and that the effect of Documents on the dependent variable varies over its 9 
 
range. To guard against this possibility, we control for the square of the number of required 
documents (Documents
2). 
  A number of studies have shown that small countries tend to trade more than the large 
countries  and  that  the  same  holds  for  rich  compared  with  poor  countries.  One  might  then 
speculate that the reason why income and population matter for the strength of the documents-
time  cost  relationship  is  because  income  and  population  are  picking  up  the  effect  of  trade 
openness. To check for this possibility, we control for trade (exports plus imports) to GDP ratio 
(log values of the average of trade to  GDP ratio taken over 2001-2005) interacted with  the 
number of required documents (Documents* Trade to GDP ratio).
4 
  The argument in the previous paragraph can be extended to another variable: the  quality 
of the overall business climate. For example , higher income countries are likely to be less 
regulated (less burdensome business climate). Hence, the differential effect of the number of 
required documents on the time cost across rich and poor countries could potentially be the 
differential effect across less and more regulated economies if regulation and required documents 
to trade  are compliments for the time cost. To guard against this possibility, we control for 
Documents*Business Climate, where Business Climate equals the log of the average value over 
2001-2005 of the overall score of economic freedom as measured by the Index of Economic 
Freedom, Heritage Foundation. 
  Another  factor  that  is  known  to  be  correlated  with  income  level  and  the  business 
regulations is corruption. Typically, corruption falls with higher income levels and increases with 
various  aspects  of  more  stringent  regulation  (such  as,  the  number  of  documents  required  to 
                                                           
4 We also experimented with using an overall (weighted) tariff rate, average values over 2001 to 2005 and taken 
from World Development Indicators, World Bank. However, our main results did not change much on adding the 
tariff measure interacted with Documents to any of the specifications discussed in the paper. In fact, our results for 
the main interaction terms were strengthened by using the weighted tariff measure stated. 10 
 
export and import). The relationship between corruption and country size is less clear, in part due 
to little research work so far in this area. To ensure that our measures of income and/or country 
size are not spuriously picking up the effect of corruption on the dependent variable, we control 
for Documents*Corruption, where Corruption is measured by the “freedom from corruption” 
sub-index of the Index of Economic Freedom, Heritage Foundation. We use log of the average 
values of the freedom from corruption sub-index, where the average is taken over 2001-2005.  
  Next, we control for social, cultural and political factors interacted with Documents. It is 
argued that one disadvantage of being large is that large countries are also more diverse such as 
along ethnic lines. The greater diversity makes it more difficult to closely cater to individual 
preferences over public goods and in reaching consensus over reforms. Independently of country 
size,  studies  have  shown  that  greater  ethnic  fractionalization  has  a  direct  adverse  effect  on 
various aspects of overall development and the quality of institutions. To ensure that neither our 
income nor the population measure is picking up the effect of ethnic diversity, we control for the 
degree of ethnic fractionalization (Ethnic) interacted with  Documents, where the measure of 
ethnic fractionalization is taken from a recent study by Alesina et al. (2003). The remaining 
controls  include  dummy  variables  for  the  largest  religious  group  in  the  country  (Catholic, 
Muslim, Protestant and the residual category of all other religions) and a measure of the quality 
of democracy taken from the Polity IV database, average over 2001-2005 (Polity). The controls 
for the main religious group (interacted with Documents) are in the nature of robustness checks, 
although theory provides little guidance on how religion correlates with trade facilitation, income 
or country-size. For Polity, one might suspect it to be higher (better democracy) in the richer 
countries. Further, reflecting better governance, higher values of Polity may be correlated with 11 
 
lower levels of the number of required documents to trade. Hence, income could easily pick up 
the effect of better quality of democracy on the time cost of shipments. 
 
3. Estimation 
Regression  results  for  the  main  specification  are  provided  in  Table  4.  Regressing  Time  on 
Documents  without  any  other  controls  shows  a  large  positive  relationship  between  the  two 
(column 1). The estimated coefficient value of Documents equals 1.08, significant at less than 
the 1 percent level. Controlling for country fixed effects causes the estimated coefficient value of 
Documents to decline sharply to .331, but it remains significant at less than the 1 percent level 
(column 2). Given our double log specification, the estimate implies that a 1 percent increase in 
the number of required documents (without logs) leads to .331 percent change in the time cost of 
shipments (without logs). Alternatively, moving from the smallest value of Documents in our 
sample to its largest value is associated with an increase in the time cost of shipments (without 
logs) that equals about 69 percent of its initial value. This is an economically large effect.  
  Controlling for time fixed effects causes the estimated coefficient value of Documents to 
decline to about half its value from .331 above to .161 (column 3). However, the coefficient 
value is still economically large and statistically significant at less than the 1 percent level. What 
the results show so far is that the number of required documents to export and import is strongly 
positively correlated with the time cost of shipments, notwithstanding the fact that our measure 
of time cost includes various factors such as time taken for unloading the cargo that has nothing 
to do with the number of required documents. 
  We now explore how the Time-Documents relationship highlighted above depends on the 
income level and country size. To this end, we add the interaction term between Documents and 12 
 
Population  and  the  interaction  term  between  Documents  and  Income  separately  to  the 
specification above. Regression results in column 4 (of Table 4) show that controlling for the 
interaction  term  between  Documents  and  Population  alone  does  not  give  any  significant 
variation  in  the  effect  of  Documents  on  Time  across  small  and  large  countries.  That  is,  the 
estimated  coefficient  value  of  Documents*Population  is  statistically  insignificant  at  the  10 
percent level (p value of .131). In contrast, when we control for the interaction term between 
Documents  and  Income  alone,  the  results  show  the  Documents-Time  relationship  does  vary 
significantly  with  the  level  of  income.  That  is,  the  estimated  coefficient  value  of 
Documents*Income is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (column 5). Given that some 
studies  show  that  smaller  countries  are  somewhat  richer,  it  is  best  to  control  for  both  the 
interaction  terms  simultaneously  to  guard  against  either  of  income  or  population  (or  both) 
picking up the effect of the other. Controlling for both the interaction terms simultaneously we 
find that it is indeed the case that individually controlling for the two interaction terms tends to 
bias their estimated coefficient values towards zero. That is, in column 6 where we add both the 
interaction terms to the specification, the estimated coefficient values of both the interaction 
terms are economically large and statistically significant at less than the 5 percent level. Further, 
consistent  with  our  initial  hypothesis,  the  effect  of  required  documents  on  the  time  cost  is 
positive but significantly larger at the relatively low levels of income and at relatively smaller 
population levels. In other words, our results do not reject the claim that the richer and the 
smaller countries are more efficient (in terms of the time cost) in their documentation process. 
  To get a sense of the magnitudes, consider a move from the smallest to the lowest value 
of Documents. What is the estimated impact of this on Time and how much does this effect vary 
with  the income level  and the population  level? Focusing on income level  first,  the  change 13 
 
implies that for an average sized country (population fixed at its mean value), the consequent 
change in Time equals .553 for the poorest country, significant at less than the 1 percent level. 
For the median country on the income ladder, the corresponding change equals a mere .077, 
significant at less than the 10 percent level. For the richest country, the corresponding change in 
Time is actually negative but statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level (p value of .110). 
Now,  consider  how  population  affects  the  magnitude  of  the  Time-Documents 
relationship. Fixing the income level at its mean value, a move from the smallest to the largest 
value of Documents implies that the value of  Time increases by .41 at the highest value of 
Population,  a  large  change  significant  at  less  than  the  1  percent  level.  However,  the 
corresponding change at the smallest value of Population is actually negative equaling -.221 but 
statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level. The results above strongly confirm that the 
relationship between increased documentation and the time cost in exporting and importing is 
not a simplistic one; it depends strongly on the income level and the size of the country. 
We complete the description of our results for the baseline specification by adding the 
square  of  the  number  of  required  documents  to  the  specification  above.  Regression  results 
confirm that doing so makes no difference to the qualitative nature of the results discussed above 
(column 7). 
  Robustness of the results for the interaction terms discussed above is confirmed in Table 
5. The table provides regression results adding the remaining controls discussed in the previous 
section to the specification discussed above. Briefly, the additional controls in the table include 
the interaction terms between Documents and trade to GDP ratio, corruption, business climate, 
ethnic  fractionalization,  quality  of  democracy  and  the  main  religious  group  in  the  country. 
Regression results adding these controls sequentially to the specification above are provided 14 
 
through columns 1-5, Table 5. These results confirm the results discussed above in a qualitative 
sense. Quantitatively, adding the mentioned controls only serves to strengthen our main results; 
that is, the estimated coefficient values of our main interaction terms  are only increased (in 
absolute value) by adding the controls (column 7 in Table 4 vs. columns 1-5 in Table 5). 
  For  the  various  controls  discussed  above,  we  find  that  they  have  little  effect  on  the 
dependent variable. This is not too surprising as we stated earlier. That is, while corruption for 
example, may be expected to be well correlated with the time cost of shipments, there is little 
reason to believe the strength of the relationship between time cost and the number of required 
documents should vary with the level of corruption. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The paper shows that the number of documents required for export and import adds to the time 
cost of shipments, but this positive effect varies sharply depending on the income level and the 
size of the country. Simply comparing the number of required documents does not give us an 
accurate picture as to which countries face higher time cost of shipments. More broadly, simply 
comparing input-based  measures  across countries  or over time may not  give us  an accurate 
picture of the actual quality of the business climate as experienced by private agents. We hope 
that the present paper inspires future work to better understand how input-based measures need 
be interpreted in terms of their impact on the functioning of economies.  
   15 
 
References 
[1] Alesina, Alberto and Romain Wacziarg (1998), “Openness, Country Size and Government,” Journal of 
Public Economics, 69(3): 305-321. 
[2] Alesina, Alberto (2002), “The Size of Countries: Does  It Matter?”  Harvard  Institute of  Economic 
Research, Discussion Paper No. 1975, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
[3] Djankov, Simeon, Caroline Freund and Cong S. Pham (2010), “Trading On Time,” Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 92(1): 166-173. 
[4] Freund, Caroline and Diana Weinhold (2000), “On the Effect of the Internet on International Trade,” 
International Finance Discussion Papers No. 693, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
[5] Hertel, Thomas W., Terrie Walmsley and Ken Itakura (2001), “Dynamic Effect of the “New Age" Free 
Trade Agreement between Japan and Singapore,” Journal of Economic Integration, 16(4): 446-84. 
[6] Rose, Andrew (2006), “Size Really Doesn’t Matter: In Search for a National Scale Effect,” Journal of 
Japanese International Economies, 20(4): 482-507. 
[7] Wilson, John S., Catherine L. Mann and Tsunehiro Otsuki (2003), “Trade Facilitation and Economic 
Development: Measuring the Impact,” World Bank Working Paper No. 2988, World Bank, Washington 
D.C. 
 
   16 
 
Table 1: Description of Variables 
Variable  Description 
Time  Log of the time it takes to clear all procedures for exporting and importing a good. That 
data span from 2006 to 20010. The time for exporting and importing is recorded in calendar 
days. The time calculation for a procedure starts from the moment it is initiated and runs 
until it is completed. If a procedure can be accelerated for an additional cost and is available 
to  all  trading  companies,  the  fastest  legal  procedure  is  chosen.  Fast-track  procedures 
applying to firms located in an export processing zone are not taken into account because 
they are not available to all trading companies. Ocean transport time is not included. It is 
assumed that neither the exporter nor the importer wastes time and that each commits to 
completing each remaining procedure without delay. Procedures that can be completed in 
parallel are measured as simultaneous. The waiting time between procedures – for example, 
during unloading of the cargo – is included in the measure. Source: Doing Business, World 
Bank. 
Documents  Log of the number of documents required to export and import. One year lagged values are 
used. The data span from 2005 to 2009. All documents required per shipment to export and 
import the goods are recorded. It is assumed that the contract has already been agreed upon 
and signed by both parties. Documents required for clearance by government ministries, 
customs authorities, port and container terminal authorities, health and technical control 
agencies  and  banks  are  taken  into  account.  Since  payment  is  by  letter  of  credit,  all 
documents required by banks for the issuance or securing of a letter of credit are also taken 
into account. Documents that are renewed annually and that do not require renewal per 
shipment (for example, an annual tax clearance certificate) are not included. Source: Doing 
Business, World Bank.  
Population  Log of the average level of total population of a country, where the average is taken over 
2001-2005. Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
Income  Log  of  the  average  level  of  GDP  per  capita  (PPP  adjusted  and  at  constant  2005 
International $), where the average is taken over 2001-2005. Source: World Development 
Indicators, World Bank. 
Trade to GDP ratio  Log of the average level of trade (exports plus imports) to GDP ratio, where the average is 
taken over 2001-2005. Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
Corruption  Log  of  the  average  level  of  the  “freedom  from  corruption”  score  as  measured  by  the 
Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, where the average is taken over 2001-
2005 values. Source: Heritage Foundation. 
Business Climate  Log of the average level of the “overall” score of economic freedom as measured by the 
Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, where the average is taken over 2001-
2005 values. Source: Heritage Foundation. 
Ethnic  A measure of ethnic fractionalization. Higher values imply more ethnic fractionalization or 
diversity. Source: Alesina et al. (2003), Journal of Economic Growth, June 2003; Table A1. 
Polity  Polity  variable  from  Polity  IV  data.  Higher  values  imply  better  quality  of  democracy. 
Average values of the variable taken over 2001-2005 are used. Source Polity IV Database. 
Catholic  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest religious group in the country is Catholic and 0 
otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Muslim  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest religious group in the country is Muslim and 0 
otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
Protestant  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest religious group in the country is Protestant and 0 
otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
All other religious groups  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the largest religious group in the country is the residual 
group (other than Catholic, Muslim and Protestant) and 0 otherwise. Source: La Porta et al. 
(1999). 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable  Mean 
Standard 
deviation  Minimum  Maximum  Observations 
Time  3.98  0.51  2.89  5.31  625 
Documents  2.73  0.27  1.95  3.53  625 
Population  15.57  2.03  10.76  20.78  625 
Income  7.99  0.94  5.53  9.75  625 
Trade to GDP ratio  64.37  30.98  20.30  177.80  605 
Corruption  28.84  13.48  10.00  73.40  515 
Business Climate  55.91  8.35  16.40  76.72  515 
Ethnic  0.49  0.25  0  .93  605 
Polity  2.92  5.86  -9.2  10  525 
Catholic  0.33  0.47  0  1  625 
Muslim  0.30  0.46  0  1  625 
Protestant  0.14  0.34  0  1  625 
All other religious groups  0.24  0.43  0  1  625 
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Table 3: Correlation between the explanatory variables 
Documents  1 
                    Population  0.29  1 
                  Income  -0.36  -0.16  1 
                Trade to GDP ratio  -0.03  -0.17  0.20  1 
              Corruption  -0.21  -0.17  0.48  0.12  1 
            Business Climate  -0.21  -0.17  0.30  -0.12  0.67  1 
          Ethnic  0.17  0.29  -0.37  -0.14  -0.28  -0.13  1 
        Polity  -0.37  0.00  0.26  -0.10  0.38  0.57  -0.14  1 
      Catholic  -0.15  -0.10  0.12  -0.13  0.17  0.35  -0.10  0.30  1 
    Muslim  0.19  0.24  -0.13  -0.06  -0.27  -0.31  0.13  -0.39  -0.45  1 
  Protestant  -0.01  -0.22  0.02  0.05  0.20  0.12  0.05  0.22  -0.28  -0.26  1 
All other religious groups  -0.04  0.03  -0.01  0.17  -0.04  -0.12  -0.07  -0.05  -0.39  -0.36  -0.22 
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Table 4: Base regression results 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Dependent variable: Time 
            Documents*Population 






       
[.131] 
 
[.025]  [.022] 
Documents*Income 




         




***  -.323  1.35
**  .594  .773 
 
[.000]  [.000]  [.010]  [.307]  [.026]  [.185]  [.326] 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects 
   
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Documents
2 
           
-.025 
             
[.796] 
Observations  625  625  625  625  625  625  625 
Number of 
countries  125  125  125  125  125  125  125 
P-values in brackets. All regressions use Huber-White robust standard errors. Significance level is denoted by *** 
(1% or less), ** (5% or less) and * (10% or less). 
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Table 5: Robustness results 
Dependent variable: Time  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Documents*Population  0.081**  0.099**  0.102**  0.120**  0.108** 
 
[0.027]  [0.035]  [0.021]  [0.017]  [0.047] 
Documents*Income  -0.182*  -0.234**  -0.323**  -0.336**  -0.331** 
 
[0.064]  [0.018]  [0.049]  [0.035]  [0.041] 
Documents  0.785  0.966  1.918  1.948  1.828 
 
[0.367]  [0.331]  [0.260]  [0.255]  [0.273] 
Year fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Documents
2  -0.074  -0.106  -0.143  -0.187  -0.125 
 
[0.498]  [0.361]  [0.144]  [0.171]  [0.505] 
Documents*Trade to GDP ratio  -0.002  -0.004  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002 
 
[0.457]  [0.299]  [0.371]  [0.364]  [0.555] 
Documents*Corruption 
 
0.013  0.016  0.014  0.01 
   
[0.237]  [0.146]  [0.251]  [0.421] 
Documents*Regulation 
 
-0.002  -0.001  0  -0.003 
   
[0.849]  [0.898]  [0.991]  [0.805] 
Documents*Ethnic 
   
-0.395  -0.429  -0.3 
     
[0.429]  [0.388]  [0.541] 
Documents*Catholic 
     
0.012  0.082 
       
[0.969]  [0.799] 
Documents*Muslim 
     
0.098  0.13 
       
[0.569]  [0.441] 
Documents*Protestant 
     
-0.503  -0.533 
       
[0.161]  [0.139] 
Documents*Polity 
       
0.014 
         
[0.489] 
Constant  3.34***  2.94***  2.55***  2.41**  2.91* 
 
[0.000]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.035]  [0.060] 
R-squared  0.359  0.373  0.376  0.379  0.384 
Observations  605  505  505  505  480 
Number of countries  121  101  101  101  96 
P-values in brackets. All regressions use Huber-White robust standard errors. Significance level is denoted by *** 
(1% or less), ** (5% or less) and * (10% or less). Sample size varies due to missing observations. 
 